bac2b27bb8
BREAKING CHANGES: - Remove -cskill suffix from all skill names (use standard kebab-case) - Simplify marketplace.json to only official fields (fixes Issue #5) - SKILL.md body must be <500 lines (progressive disclosure via references/) New features: - Cross-platform support for 8+ platforms (Claude Code, Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI) - scripts/install-template.sh: Auto-detect platform installer with --dry-run - scripts/validate.py: Spec compliance checker for generated skills - scripts/security_scan.py: Security scanner for hardcoded keys and dangerous patterns - MIGRATION.md: v3.x to v4.0 migration guide - 6 new reference files for progressive disclosure from lean SKILL.md Key changes: - SKILL.md: 4,116 → 272 lines with spec-compliant YAML frontmatter - marketplace.json: Stripped to {name, plugins} only - article-to-prototype-cskill/ → article-to-prototype/ - stock-analyzer-cskill/ → stock-analyzer/ - Export system integrates validation + security scanning - README.md rewritten for all supported platforms - Phase 5 pipeline outputs SKILL.md-first, spec-compliant skills Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
30 lines
1 KiB
Markdown
30 lines
1 KiB
Markdown
# SC-021: Security Scan Detects Shell Injection Patterns
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> Covers: FR-014 — Security scan SHOULD check for shell injection patterns in generated scripts
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> Type: Happy Path
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## Given
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- A generated skill directory `unsafe-skill/` contains `scripts/runner.py` with:
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```python
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import subprocess
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user_input = input("Enter filename: ")
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subprocess.call(f"cat {user_input}", shell=True)
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```
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## When
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- The security scan is run on `unsafe-skill/`
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## Then
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- The security scan identifies a shell injection risk
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- The `security` list contains a finding about `subprocess.call` with `shell=True` and unsanitized input
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## Verification Method
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**Method**: Automated test
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**Steps**:
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1. Create `unsafe-skill/scripts/runner.py` with `subprocess.call(..., shell=True)` using f-string interpolation
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2. Run the security scan
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3. Assert security findings reference shell injection or `shell=True`
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**Expected evidence**: Security finding like `"Potential shell injection in scripts/runner.py: subprocess.call with shell=True and string interpolation"`.
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